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Davis: The Scope of § 337 Post-Suprema

NOTE
The Scope of § 337 Post-Suprema, Inc. v.
International Trade Commission
Suprema, Inc. v. International Trade Commission, 796 F.3d 1338 (Fed. Cir.
2015) (en banc).

Matthew Davis*

I. INTRODUCTION
Imagine that a statute prohibits the distribution of murder weapons.
Now, suppose that Gang A (“A”) sends Gang B (“B”) a shipment of freshly
assembled, unused guns, intending to induce B to commit murders. At the
moment B receives the shipment, are those guns murder weapons? If not,
would you answer differently if A had already shipped B thousands of guns,
all of which B ultimately used to commit murder? If not, would your answer
change if law enforcement could intervene only after B commits murder?
The Federal Circuit recently grappled with similar questions in a patent
law context. In Suprema, Inc. v. International Trade Commission,1 the court
was concerned with 19 U.S.C. § 1337 (“§ 337”), a provision of the Tariff Act
of 1930 which proscribes the importation of “articles that infringe” a patent.2
At issue was whether goods that did not infringe a patent in their own right
could be considered “articles that infringe” based on the importer’s intent to
use those goods to induce infringement of a patented method.3 One might
naturally answer no. Much like a gun distributed with intent to induce murder is not yet a murder weapon at the moment of its distribution, an article
imported with intent to induce infringement is not yet an article that infringes
at the time of importation.4 The Federal Circuit, however, concluded otherwise.5 At oral argument, the court appeared to latch on to the fact that all
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1. 796 F.3d 1338 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (en banc).
2. Tariff Act of 1930, 19 U.S.C. § 1337(a)(1)(B)(i) (2012).
3. Suprema, 796 F.3d at 1342.
4. See id. at 1354 (Dyk, J., dissenting) (“It is a far different matter where . . .
inducement is separate from the importation, and the articles . . . may or may not
ultimately be used to directly infringe a method claim . . . .”).
5. Id. at 1352–53 (majority opinion).
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imported articles were ultimately used to infringe the patent.6 And throughout its opinion, the court was clearly concerned with the prospect that ruling
to the contrary would prevent the International Trade Commission (“ITC”)
from excluding these articles.7
The court began its analysis by examining the ITC’s import-excluding
construction under the Chevron framework.8 After deeming the phrase “articles that infringe” ambiguous, the court concluded that the ITC’s interpretation was reasonable and authorized the agency to exclude non-infringing imports that may or may not be used to induce infringement.9 Although this
broadens the ITC’s jurisdiction over patents focused on novel methods of use,
the court’s attempt to fill a statutory gap may create far more issues.10
This Note first sets forth the facts and holding of the Federal Circuit’s
decision in Suprema. Then, it examines the origins of the ITC, the relationship between § 337 and the Patent Act, and the cases that were raised in the
majority and dissenting opinions. Next, it details the court’s interpretation of
§ 337 under the Chevron framework. Finally, this Note appraises the court’s
construction, addresses the concerns underlying the decision, and assesses the
harmful consequences of extending the ITC’s authority to the importation of
non-infringing articles intended to induce post-importation infringement.

II. FACTS AND HOLDING
Cross Match Technologies, Inc. (“Cross Match”), a domestic supplier of
fingerprint scanners and the intervenor in this action, is the assignee of a patented fingerprint scanning method.11 Suprema, Inc. (“Suprema”), a Korean
manufacturer of fingerprint scanners, and Mentalix, Inc. (“Mentalix”), a domestic importer of Suprema’s scanners, are the appellants.12 Suprema’s
scanners cannot function until they are loaded with custom-developed software.13 After Mentalix imports Suprema’s scanners, it loads them with its
own software and then uses and sells the final products.14 The ITC, the ap6. See Oral Argument at 47:26, Suprema, Inc. v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 796 F.3d
1338
(Fed.
Cir.
2015)
(No.
12-1170),
http://oralarguments.cafc.uscourts.gov/default.aspx?fl=2012-1170_252015.mp3.
7. Suprema, 796 F.3d at 1351–52.
8. Id. at 1346–53.
9. See id. at 1369 (O’Malley, J., dissenting).
10. See id. (“The majority’s attempt to shoehorn the language of §
1337(a)(1)(B)(i) into a strained interpretation of the statute under the guise of deferring to the Commission’s interpretation may prevent some rare potential abuses of our
patent system, but [it] also opens Pandora’s Box.”).
11. See Suprema Inc. v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 742 F.3d 1350, 1357 (Fed. Cir.
2013), vacated, 796 F.3d 1338 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (en banc); U.S. Patent No. 7,203,344
(filed Jan. 16, 2003).
12. Suprema, 796 F.3d at 1355.
13. Id. at 1341–42.
14. Id. at 1342.
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pellee in this action, is a quasi-judicial federal agency authorized by § 337 to
investigate the importation of articles that infringe a patent.15
In May 2010, Cross Match filed a § 337 complaint with the ITC, alleging that Mentalix directly infringed its patent and that Suprema induced that
infringement.16 The ITC concluded that Mentalix directly infringed Cross
Match’s patent by integrating its software with Suprema’s scanners and using
the final product within the United States.17 The ITC also found that Suprema had induced this infringement.18 Based on these findings, the ITC
issued an exclusion order blocking the importation of Suprema’s scanners
and a cease-and-desist order enjoining Mentalix’s distribution of the scanners.19 Suprema and Mentalix subsequently appealed the ITC’s findings to
the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit.20
On appeal, Suprema and Mentalix argued that the ITC had no authority
to issue the exclusion order because the scanners could not be used to infringe
until after importation.21 A panel of the Federal Circuit agreed and vacated
the ITC’s ruling.22 Because the statutory phrase “articles that infringe” references the status of the articles at the time of importation, the court reasoned
that an exclusion order could not be based on induced infringement if direct
infringement only occurred after importation.23
After the ITC and Cross Match successfully petitioned for rehearing en
banc,24 the Federal Circuit began its analysis by examining the ITC’s construction of § 337 under the Chevron framework.25 Under the first step of
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.

See Tariff Act of 1930, 19 U.S.C. § 1337(b) (2012).
Suprema, 796 F.3d at 1341–42.
Id. at 1343.
Id.
See generally Suprema Inc. v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 626 F. App’x 273 (Fed.
Cir. 2015); see Certain Biometric Scanning Devices, Components Thereof, Associated Software, & Prods. Containing the Same, Inv. No. 337-TA-720, USITC Pub. 4366,
2011 WL 8883591 (Nov. 10, 2011) (Final).
20. Suprema, 796 F.3d at 1344.
21. Id.
22. Suprema, Inc. v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 742 F.3d 1350, 1357 (Fed. Cir. 2013),
vacated, 796 F.3d 1338 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (en banc).
23. Id. at 1357 (“We conclude that § 337(a)(1)(B)(i), by tying the Commission’s
authority to the importation, sale for importation, or sale within the U.S. after importation of articles that infringe a valid and enforceable U.S. patent, leaves the Commission powerless to remedy acts of induced infringement in these circumstances.”).
24. Suprema, 796 F.3d at 1345.
25. Id. at 1346. In Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council,
Inc., the Supreme Court set forth a two-part test for determining whether judicial
deference is granted to an agency’s interpretation of a statute which it administers.
467 U.S. 837, 842–43 (1984). A court must first ask whether the statutory language
directly answers the precise question at issue. Id. at 842. If yes, the court must give
effect to Congress’s unambiguous intent. Id. at 842–43. If no, the court must next
ask “whether the agency’s answer is based on a permissible construction of the statute.” Id. at 843. The agency’s interpretation will prevail if it is not unreasonable,
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Chevron, the court concluded that § 337 did not clearly address whether the
ITC could base an exclusion order on the inducement of post-importation
infringement.26 In reaching this conclusion, the court cited the disparity between § 337’s reference to infringing “articles” and the Patent Act’s reference to infringing “conduct.”27 The court then proceeded to the second step
of Chevron, under which it determined that the ITC’s construction was reasonable.28 In particular, the court explained that the ITC’s construction was
consistent with its congressional mandate “to safeguard United States commercial interests at the border” and supported by “the statutory text, policy,
and legislative history of Section 337.”29 Accordingly, the court reversed the
panel’s decision and reinstated the ITC’s ruling that non-infringing articles
used to induce post-importation infringement are “articles that infringe.”30

III. LEGAL BACKGROUND
Part A discusses the origins of the ITC and the expansion of the agency’s authority following amendments to its governing statute, § 337. Part B
examines cases concerning induced infringement that purportedly lend support to the instant decision. Lastly, Part C discusses ITC practice consistent
with the view that non-infringing imports used to induce post-importation
infringement are not “articles that infringe.”

A. Origins of the ITC and Modern § 337
From its inception until 1974, the ITC’s authority was relatively meager.
In 1916, Congress established the ITC, then known as the Tariff Commission,
through the Revenue Act.31 In its infancy, the ITC was a fact-finding agency,32 advising Congress as it set tariff rates and the President as he administered tariff laws.33 The ITC first acquired the authority to investigate importation when Congress enacted the Tariff Act of 1930.34 Section 337, like its

whether or not the court would have arrived at the same result. Holder v. Martinez
Gutierrez, 132 S. Ct. 2011, 2017 (2012).
26. Suprema, 796 F.3d at 1346.
27. Id. at 1347.
28. Id. at 1349.
29. Id. at 1341, 1349.
30. Id. at 1352–53.
31. Pub. L. No. 64-271, 39 Stat. 795 (1916).
32. Daniel K. Tarullo, Law and Politics in Twentieth Century Tariff History, 34
UCLA L. REV. 285, 298 (1986).
33. Sapna Kumar, The Other Patent Agency: Congressional Regulation of the
ITC, 61 FLA. L. REV. 529, 541 (2009).
34. Tariff Act of 1930, Pub. L. No. 71-361, § 337, 46 Stat. 590, 703–04 (1930)
(codified as amended at 19 U.S.C. § 1330 (2012)).
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precursor, proscribed “unfair methods of competition and unfair acts in the
importation of articles into the United States.”35
The ITC’s authority broadened considerably when Congress amended §
337 through the Trade Act of 1974.36 The amendment not only granted the
agency final decision-making authority, but authorized the ITC to issue exclusion orders barring the importation of infringing articles and cease-anddesist orders enjoining the post-importation sale of infringing imports.37 Because this relief allowed patentees to effectively block allegedly infringing
imports, the ITC’s popularity as a forum increased.38 In an attempt to limit
the scope of its jurisdiction, the ITC subsequently required “some nexus between unfair methods or acts and importation” before it had power to act.39
The Omnibus Foreign Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988 substantively amended § 337, rendering the nexus requirement obsolete40 and creating the statutory scheme at issue.41 With minor exceptions, § 337 splits unlawful activities into two categories: (1) unfair competition or unfair acts in
the importation of articles that do not infringe intellectual property; and (2)
35. Compare Tariff Act of 1922, Pub. L. No. 67-318, § 316(a), 42 Stat. 858, 943
(1922), with Tariff Act of 1930, Pub. L. No. 71-361, § 337, 46 Stat. 590, 703–04
(1930) (codified as amended at 19 U.S.C. § 1337 (2012)); Frischer & Co., Inc. v.
Bakelite Corp., 39 F.2d 247, 257 (C.C.P.A. 1930) (construing § 316 and holding that
“unfair methods of competition and unfair acts” included “the importation and sale of
[infringing] articles during the life of [a] patent”); In re Orion Co., 71 F.2d 458, 463
(C.C.P.A. 1934) (noting that § 316 “was the prototype of section 337 . . . and is, in
substance, the same”).
36. Trade Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-618, 88 Stat. 1978, 2009 (1975) (codified
as amended at 19 U.S.C. § 2231 (2012)) (“The United States Tariff Commission . . .
is renamed as the United States International Trade Commission.”).
37. §§ 377(d), (f), 88 Stat. at 2054–55; Colleen V. Chien, Patently Protectionist?
An Empirical Analysis of Patent Cases at the International Trade Commission, 50
WM. & MARY L. REV. 63, 73 (2008).
38. Chien, supra note 37, at 73–74; Kumar, supra note 33, at 546 (noting that
“75% of all § 337 actions involved patent infringement, 22% involved trademark
infringement, and 4% [involved] copyright infringement”). Prior to 1974, few cases
brought under § 337 involved patents, in part, because complainants were forced to
comply with an unattractive and informal remedial procedure. Id. at 544. To obtain
relief, a patentee would first submit a complaint to the ITC. Id. If convinced of the
merits of the case, the ITC would then attempt to persuade the President to exclude
the infringing articles. Id.
39. Certain Elec. Devices with Image Processing Sys., Components Thereof, &
Associated Software, Inv. No. 337-TA-724, USITC Pub. 4374, 2012 WL 3246515, at
*10 (Dec. 21, 2011) (Final) (quoting Certain Welded Stainless Steel Pipe & Tube,
Inv. No. 337-TA-29, USITC Pub. 863, 1978 WL 50692, at *11 (Feb. 22, 1978) (Final)).
40. Id. at *11 (“Modern section 337(a)(1)(B)(i) eliminated the domestic industry
injury requirement, obviating a need to show a nexus between importation and injury
. . . .”).
41. See Pub. L. No. 100-418, 102 Stat. 1107 (codified at 19 U.S.C. § 1337
(2012)).
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the importation, sale for importation, or post-importation sale of articles that
infringe intellectual property.42 Section 337(a)(1)(B) proscribes the importation, sale for importation, or post-importation sale of articles that infringe a
patent or are made using a patented process.43 As used in § 337(a)(1)(B)(i),
the word “infringe” derives its meaning from the provision defining patent
infringement, 35 U.S.C. § 271.44

B. Patent Infringement Under § 271
Patent infringement may be direct or indirect.45 One directly infringes a
patent by using, making, offering to sell, selling, or importing a patented invention.46 There are two types of indirect infringement, both of which must
be predicated on an underlying act of direct infringement.47 The first, infringement by inducement, occurs when one actively induces infringement of
a patent.48 This form of indirect infringement is often analogized to aiding
and abetting a crime or tort.49 The second, contributory infringement, occurs
when one sells, offers to sell, or imports a material component of a patented
invention that is substantially incapable of non-infringing use.50
In Suprema, the majority opinion cited Standard Oil Co. v. Nippon Shokubai Kagaku Kogyo Co., Ltd.51 in support of its ruling.52 There, the issue
was whether the laches period for claims of induced infringement began running at the moment of direct infringement or, instead, at the moment of the
42. Tariff Act of 1930, 19 U.S.C. § 1337(a)(1)(A) (2012) (establishing “[u]nfair
methods of competition and unfair acts”); §§ 1337(a)(1)(B)–(E) (violation of intellectual property rights).
43. Id. § 1337(a)(1)(B).
44. Suprema, Inc. v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 796 F.3d 1338, 1346 (Fed. Cir. 2015)
(en banc).
45. See id. at 1344.
46. § 271(a).
47. See, e.g., Aro Mfg. Co. v. Convertible Top Replacement Co., 365 U.S. 336,
340–41 (1961); Limelight Networks, Inc. v. Akamai Techs., Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2111,
2117 (2014).
48. § 271(b). The inducing party must also know that the induced acts constitute
infringement. Global-Tech Appliances, Inc. v. SEB S.A., 563 U.S. 754, 765 (2011).
This knowledge may be shown by either actual knowledge or willful blindness. Id. at
2069. To prove willful blindness, a plaintiff must show the inducing party subjectively believed in a high probability that the induced acts constituted infringement and
took deliberate actions to avoid learning of infringement. Id. at 2070.
49. E.g., Hewlett-Packard Co. v. Bausch & Lomb Inc., 909 F.2d 1464, 1469
(Fed. Cir. 1990) (analogizing the inducement of infringement to aiding and abetting a
tort); Sims v. W. Steel Co., 551 F.2d 811, 817 (10th Cir. 1977) (analogizing one who
induces infringement to an accessory before the fact).
50. § 271(c).
51. 754 F.2d 345 (Fed Cir. 1985).
52. Suprema, Inc. v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 796 F.3d 1338, 1348 (Fed. Cir. 2015)
(en banc).
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inducing act.53 A domestic corporation (“Sohio”) claimed that a foreign
manufacturer incurred inducement liability by supplying an article used to
infringe its patented process but filed suit more than six years after direct
infringement occurred.54 Writing for the court, Judge Rich concluded that
“liability arose as of the time the acts were committed” for purposes of the
laches period, which barred Sohio’s recovery.55 As a result, Standard Oil
teaches that Cross Match would have no remedy if it brought suit against
Suprema more than six years after the inducing acts were committed.56 It is
difficult to discern how the case lends support to the majority’s conclusion
that the ITC has power to act based on “the indirect infringer’s own acts, including importation that is part of inducement.”57
The ITC advanced a similar argument in its appellate brief.58 In particular, the ITC argued that, under Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster,59 an article supplied with intent to induce infringement is an article that
infringes.60 In Grokster, the issue was whether the proprietor of a peer-topeer file-sharing program was liable for copyright infringement by virtue of
knowingly and intentionally distributing free software that allowed its users
to share copyrighted music and videos.61 The Supreme Court answered in the
affirmative, holding that “one who distributes a device with the object of
promoting its use to infringe . . . , as shown by clear expression or other affirmative steps taken to foster infringement, is liable for the resulting acts of
infringement by third parties.”62 In a footnote, the Court clarified that “the
culpable act [was] not merely the encouragement of infringement but also the
distribution of the tool intended for infringing use.”63 However, a fair reading of the case provides poor support for the ITC’s argument. Grokster does
not contradict the principle that inducement liability must be predicated on
53. Id. at 348.
54. § 286 (“[N]o recovery shall be had for any infringement committed more

than six years prior to the filing of the complaint . . . for infringement in the action.”).
55. Standard Oil Co., 754 F.2d at 348 (emphasis omitted).
56. See Brief of Amicus Curiae Microsoft Corp. in Support of Neither Party at
17 n.9, Suprema, Inc. v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 796 F.3d 1338 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (No.
12-1170), 2014 WL 4312225, at *17; Appellants’ Non-Confidential En Banc Reply
Brief at 10, Suprema, Inc. v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 796 F.3d 1338 (Fed. Cir. 2015)
(No. 12-1170), 2014 WL 6746882, at *10.
57. Suprema, Inc. v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 796 F.3d 1338, 1348 (Fed. Cir. 2015)
(en banc).
58. See Appellants’ Non-Confidential En Banc Reply Brief, supra note 56, at
23–25.
59. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913 (2005).
60. See Non-Confidential En Banc Brief of Appellee International Trade Commission at 24, Suprema, Inc. v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 796 F.3d 1338 (Fed Cir. 2015)
(No. 12-1170 ), 2014 WL 5427827, at *23–24.
61. Grokster, 545 U.S. at 920–21.
62. Id. at 919.
63. Id. at 940 n.13.
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direct infringement.64 Indeed, the Court later reiterated in its opinion that
“the inducement theory of course requires evidence of actual infringement.”65

C. ITC Practice
The majority also grounded its decision on the theory that Young Engineers, Inc. v. U.S. International Trade Commission evidenced an ITC practice
of excluding non-infringing imports intended to induce post-importation infringement.66 However, Young Engineers may not provide support on this
front; there, the infringing party actually imported infringing articles that
were integrated with inducing instructions.67 On appeal, the Federal Circuit
affirmed the ITC’s findings without addressing whether an exclusion order
could be based on acts of inducement alone.68 Moreover, the ITC’s exclusion
order rested on the “nexus” test, a formulation the agency recently rejected in
light of the most recent amendment to § 337.69
In its appellate brief, the ITC likewise claimed the benefit of agency
custom by citing Alloc, Inc. v. International Trade Commission70 and Kyocera Wireless Corp. v. International Trade Commission.71 But these cases,
like Young Engineers, do not evidence ITC practice consistent with the majority’s holding. In Alloc, the complainant alleged that the importation of
flooring materials with installation instructions induced consumers to infringe
its patented installation method.72 After the ITC upheld the administrative
law judge’s determination that there was no evidence of direct infringement
or intent to induce infringement,73 the Federal Circuit affirmed the ITC’s
findings on grounds that there was no evidence of direct infringement.74 And
in Kyocera, as in Young Engineers, the ITC entered an exclusion order barring the importation of articles that directly infringed the patent at the time of
importation.75 In particular, the ITC found that the respondent induced foreign parties to directly infringe the complainant’s patent before the goods
were imported.76
These cases are particularly unpersuasive in light of Certain Electronic
Devices, a recent decision in which the ITC cabined its authority under §
64. Compare id., with Limelight Networks, Inc. v. Akamai Techs., Inc., 134 S.
Ct. 2111, 2117 (2014).
65. Grokster, 545 U.S. at 940.
66. 721 F.2d 1305 (Fed. Cir. 1983).
67. Id. at 1308–09.
68. See id. at 1317.
69. Certain Elec. Devices, supra note 39, at *11.
70. 342 F.3d 1361 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
71. 545 F.3d 1340 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
72. Alloc, 342 F.3d at 1373–74.
73. Id. at 1374.
74. Id.
75. Kyocera, 545 F.3d at 1345.
76. Id. at 1346.
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337.77 There, the ITC explained that it could not remedy direct infringement
of method claims after importation.78 Method claims are drawn to conduct –
the performance of claimed steps – rather than an article.79 To directly infringe a method claim, one must “use” – or perform each step of – that method.80 However, § 337(a)(1)(B)(i) only proscribes importing and selling –
conduct that cannot practice a patented method.81 In Certain Electronic Devices, the ITC also explained that it was powerless to exclude the articles
absent direct infringement at the time of importation because the phrase “articles that infringe” references the status of the articles as imported.82

IV. INSTANT DECISION
Part A sets forth the majority opinion, which had no difficulty concluding that the phrase “articles that infringe” was both ambiguous and could
reasonably be construed as applying to articles that do not infringe in their
own right but are imported with the intent to induce infringement. Part B
examines the dissenting opinion.

A. Judge Reyna’s Majority Opinion
The majority began by analyzing the ITC’s construction under the
Chevron framework in light of the ITC’s substantive authority to administer
and interpret § 337.83 Under the first step of Chevron, the majority asked
whether the statutory phrase “articles that infringe” unambiguously precluded
the ITC from basing an exclusion order on inducement of post-importation
infringement.84 The majority answered no, reasoning that the term “infringe”
encompasses all forms of infringement, and therefore “articles that infringe”

77. Certain Elec. Devices, supra note 39, at *44.
78. Id. at *12–13.
79. In re Kollar, 286 F.3d 1326, 1332 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (noting the “distinction

between a claim to a product, device, or apparatus, all of which are tangible items,
and a claim to a process, which consists of a series of acts or steps”).
80. NTP, Inc. v. Research in Motion, Ltd., 418 F.3d 1282, 1319 (Fed. Cir. 2005)
(“[I]nfringement of method claims under section 271(a) [is] limited to use.”).
81. Ricoh Co., Ltd. v. Quanta Computer Inc., 550 F.3d 1325, 1335 (Fed. Cir.
2008) (noting that sale cannot infringe a method claim); Certain Elec. Devices, supra
note 39, at *12 (“[I]mportation is not an act that practices the steps of the asserted
method claim.”).
82. Certain Elec. Devices, supra note 39, at *9 (citing Pass & Seymour, Inc. v.
Int’l Trade Comm’n, 617 F.3d 1319, 1325 (Fed. Cir. 2011)) (finding no statutory
violation because the articles lacked limitations of the asserted claims and therefore
did not directly infringe at the time of importation).
83. Suprema, Inc. v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 796 F.3d 1338, 1345–46 (Fed. Cir.
2015) (en banc).
84. Id. at 1346.
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feasibly extends to imported articles used to induce infringement.85 After
reaching this conclusion, the majority determined that a disparity between the
focus on infringing conduct in § 271 and the focus on infringing articles in §
337 rendered the provision ambiguous.86 Because of this textual uncertainty,
the majority proceeded to the second step of Chevron, under which it asked
whether the ITC’s interpretation was reasonable.87
The majority answered yes, finding the ITC’s construction consistent
with “the statutory text, policy, and legislative history of Section 337.”88
With respect to the text, the majority found that the prohibition against “sale .
. . after importation” plainly authorized the ITC to monitor post-importation
conduct to identify infringement induced by another party.89 Citing Standard
Oil, the majority added that the inducing party would be liable at the moment
the article was imported with intent to induce infringement.90 After examining legislative history91 and several decisions delivered by the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals,92 the majority stressed that § 337 should be broadly
construed to achieve its long-standing purpose: protecting patent holders from
unfair competition and unfair trade acts.93 As the majority reasoned, a technical interpretation would ignore this purpose, allowing foreign entities to
evade § 337 merely by importing articles in piecemeal fashion.94 In view of
Young Engineers, the majority also determined the ITC had previously excluded articles on a theory of induced infringement, lending support to the
reasonableness of its current interpretation.95 Accordingly, the majority reversed the panel’s decision and held that the ITC’s interpretation was reasonable and reinstated the ITC’s construction that imported articles used to induce post-importation infringement are “articles that infringe.”96
85. Id.
86. Id. at 1346–47 (“[T]he phrase ‘articles that infringe’ does not map onto the

Patent Act’s definition of infringement. . . . An ‘article’ cannot infringe under any
subsection of § 271.”).
87. Id. at 1349.
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. See id. at 1351 (first citing S. REP. No. 67-595, at 3 (1922) (discussing congressional intent to broadly “prevent every type and form of unfair practice”); then
citing H.R. REP. No. 100-40, pt. 1, at 155 (1987) (noting the 1988 amendment was
designed to strengthen § 337); then citing H.R. REP. No. 100-576, at 112 (1988)
(providing that the 1988 amendment would provide intellectual property owners a
more effective remedy under § 337)).
92. See id. (first citing In re Von Clemm, 229 F.2d 441, 443–44 (C.C.P.A. 1955)
(noting the Commission’s broad and inclusive authority to curb unfair methods of
competition and unfair acts); then citing In re Orion Co., 71 F.2d 458, 467 (C.C.P.A.
1934) (providing that § 337 extends to “every type and form of unfair practice”)).
93. See id. at 1350–52.
94. Id. at 1352.
95. Id.
96. Id. at 1352–53.
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B. Judge O’Malley’s Dissenting Opinion
Writing in dissent, and joined by Chief Judge Prost and Judges Lourie
and Dyk,97 Judge O’Malley began by assessing the ITC’s interpretation under
the Chevron framework. Applying Chevron’s first step, Judge O’Malley
concluded that the language of § 337 unambiguously prevented the ITC from
basing an exclusion order on the inducement of post-importation infringement, particularly in instances involving infringing use of a patented method.98 As a result, Judge O’Malley contended that the ITC’s interpretation
was not entitled to deference.99 Judge O’Malley then addressed the alleged
ambiguity, which led the majority to defer to the ITC’s interpretation – under
§ 271, a person infringes, but under § 337, an article infringes.100 As Judge
O’Malley reasoned, this disparity created no ambiguity; rather, it reinforced
the conclusion that Congress tied decision making at the border to tangible,
infringing objects, not to an importer’s intent.101
Moving beyond the text, Judge O’Malley criticized several other aspects
of the majority opinion. Judge O’Malley contested the majority’s assertion
that the ITC had maintained – and the Federal Circuit had affirmed – a policy
of excluding articles solely on a theory of inducement of post-importation
infringement.102 Young Engineers, Alloc, and Kyocera, Judge O’Malley concluded, all failed to establish that the ITC previously predicated exclusion
orders solely on a finding of intent to induce post-importation infringement.103 Additionally, Judge O’Malley argued that the majority misread
Standard Oil as standing for the proposition that infringement occurs at the
time of the inducing act.104 By contrast, Judge O’Malley read Standard Oil to
hold only that inducement liability attaches at the moment the inducing act is

97. Judge Dyk, though joining Judge O’Malley’s dissenting opinion in full,
wrote separately to distinguish the ITC’s current theory of induced infringement from
its past practice. Id. at 1353 (Dyk, J., dissenting). In prior cases, Judge Dyk noted the
ITC excluded staple articles on an inducement theory only when “inducing instructions were imported alongside” the article. Id. As Judge Dyk viewed the matter, the
ITC now based its exclusion order solely on intent to induce, which would in practice
exclude all imported articles when only some may be used in an infringing manner.
Id. at 1353–54.
98. Id. at 1355–57 (O’Malley, J., dissenting) (“The word [‘article’] connotes a
physical object. . . . It is objects which are imported or sold, not methods. . . . [The]
focus under the statute must be on the point of importation, and patented methods
generally are not directly infringed until their use in the United States after importation. . . . But ‘use’ appears nowhere in § 1337(a)(1)(B)(i).”).
99. Id. at 1355.
100. Id. at 1358.
101. Id. at 1360.
102. Id. at 1362–64.
103. Id. at 1364–66.
104. Id. at 1364.
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committed.105 Third, Judge O’Malley asserted that policy considerations,
rather than the text, governed the majority’s analysis.106 As Judge O’Malley
reasoned, the majority strained to find any ambiguity that would allow deference to the ITC’s interpretation based on its conclusion that a plain reading of
§ 337 would create a border hospitable to infringers, while simultaneously
withholding relief from patent owners.107 However, because district courts
could still enjoin infringing use, block infringing imports, and award damages, Judge O’Malley concluded that the majority’s concerns were overstated.108

V. COMMENT
Judge O’Malley rightly observed that the majority erred in holding the
ITC may exclude non-infringing imports intended to induce post-importation
infringement of a patented method. Guided by policy considerations rather
than the text, the court sought to fill a statutory gap where none existed and
ignored other means of addressing the conduct at issue. Although the court’s
holding may provide a windfall to patent owners, it complicates the administrability of exclusion orders, runs the risk that businesses and consumers
will be deprived of imported products, and extends the ITC’s jurisdiction
beyond the plain language of the statute into territory reserved for district
courts.

A. The Text of § 337 Is Unambiguous
The court’s construction seems to conflict with the plain language of §
337 in two respects. First, holding that the ITC may exclude non-infringing
imports intended to induce post-importation infringement ignores that Congress tied the ITC’s authority to the importation of “articles that infringe.”109
So does suggesting the ITC may exclude non-infringing imports accompanied
by inducing instructions or non-staple articles.110 Contributory infringement,
like inducement liability, must be predicated on an underlying act of direct

105.
106.
107.
108.
109.

Id.
Id. at 1366.
Id. at 1367.
Id. at 1367–68.
See id. at 1356 (“[I]nfringement is tied, not just to a physical object, but to
the date of importation.”).
110. E.g., id. at 1353–54 (Dyk, J., dissenting); Oral Argument, supra note 6, at
25:46–26:22 (“I’m struck by your claim that this is consistent with what the Commission has done in the past. . . . I do see the Commission in past cases having issued
exclusion orders based on products that have no substantial non-infringing uses. I see
cases where the Commission has said . . . [a product] imported with the instructions
telling you to infringe . . . can be the subject of an exclusion order. I do not see any
cases that go beyond that.”); Suprema, 796 F.3d at 1367 (O’Malley, J., dissenting).

https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol81/iss3/8

12

Davis: The Scope of § 337 Post-Suprema

2016]

SCOPE OF § 337

823

infringement.111 Thus, where direct infringement occurs after importation,
the plain language of the statute dictates that the ITC has no authority to issue
an exclusion order. This is true whether directed toward articles intended to
induce infringement, articles accompanied by inducing instructions, or nonstaple articles.112
Second, holding that the ITC may remedy direct infringement of method
claims ignores that Congress expressly confined the ITC’s authority under §
337(a)(1)(B)(i) to “articles.”113 As noted, method claims are tied to conduct,
not articles.114 Although “use” of an article may practice a patented method,
such “use” will virtually always occur after importation.115 Congress’s omission of “use” in § 337(a)(1)(B)(i) is entirely consistent with the ITC’s unique
in rem jurisdiction over articles, not conduct.116 Further, including a particular form of infringement of method claims in § 337(a)(1)(B)(ii) demonstrates
that Congress limited § 337(a)(1)(B)(i) to tangible items, not intangible
methods.117 Because § 337(a)(1)(B)(ii) proscribes the importation of articles
made using a patented process, construing § 337(a)(1)(B) to encompass all
forms of infringement would render subsection (ii) surplusage.118

B. The Majority’s Analysis
As Judge O’Malley rightly notes, the majority’s analysis under Chevron
was an entirely outcome-oriented process.119 Underlying the majority’s holding was the concern that a straightforward interpretation of the statute would
111. See Aro Mfg. Co. v. Convertible Top Replacement Co., 365 U.S. 336, 341
(1961) (“[I]f there is no direct infringement of a patent there can be no contributory
infringement.”); Limelight Networks, Inc. v. Akamai Techs., Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2111,
2117 (2014) (“[I]nducement liability may arise if, but only if, [there is] . . . direct
infringement.”) (internal citations omitted).
112. See Brief of Amicus Curiae Microsoft Corp. in Support of Neither Party,
supra note 56, at *4.
113. See Certain Elec. Devices, supra note 39, at *6, *12–13.
114. See In re Kollar, 286 F.3d 1326, 1332 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (discussing the “distinction between a claim to a product, device, or apparatus, all of which are tangible
items, and a claim to a process, which consists of a series of acts”).
115. See Suprema, 796 F.3d at 1357 (“[T]here is no actual harm to a patentee until
an infringing use, and that harm only occurs after importation for method claims . . .
.”) (O’Malley, J., dissenting).
116. See Sealed Air Corp. v. U.S. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 645 F.2d 976, 985
(C.C.P.A. 1981) (“An exclusion order operates against goods, not parties.”).
117. See Suprema, 796 F.3d at 1356 (O’Malley, J., dissenting); Brief of Amicus
Curiae Microsoft Corp. in Support of Neither Party, supra note 56, at *6.
118. See ANTONIN SCALIA & BRYAN A. GARNER, READING LAW: THE
INTERPRETATION OF LEGAL TEXTS 174 (2012) (“If possible, every word and every
provision is to be given effect. . . . None should be ignored. None should needlessly
be given an interpretation that causes it to duplicate another provision or to have no
consequence.”).
119. See Suprema, 796 F.3d at 1354 (O’Malley, J., dissenting).
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prevent patentees from excluding products shipped by foreign entities beyond
the jurisdiction of district courts.120 To satisfy Chevron’s first step, the majority clearly “strain[ed] to find an ambiguity.”121 Then, the majority determined the ITC’s construction was reasonable based on ambiguous statements
in the legislative history122 and a non-existent agency policy of excluding
goods solely on a theory of inducement of post-importation infringement.123
However, because respondents named in the ITC proceedings are seldom beyond the reach of district courts, the majority’s jurisdictional and remedial concerns are largely overstated. A study conducted by Colleen Chien
revealed that, between 1995 and 2007, domestic respondents appeared in
87% of all of the ITC proceedings.124 Chien also observed that 65% of the
ITC cases involved patents at issue in district court litigation between the
same parties.125 In 89% of those parallel disputes, the district court case was
initiated before the ITC proceeding.126 In addition, many respondents at the
ITC are well-known corporations based in the United States, including Cisco,
TiVo, and Apple.127 Foreign respondents such as Sony, LG, and Nintendo
conduct substantial business in the United States and are therefore subject to
the jurisdiction of district courts.128 Even if the majority’s jurisdictional concern was borne out by the evidence, Congress, not the courts, should address
120. See id. at 1352 (majority opinion).
121. Id. at 1354 (O’Malley, J., dissenting).
122. There is almost no reason to assume that a majority of legislators, especially

those who passed the Tariff Acts of 1922 and 1930, either foresaw or endorsed the
ITC’s present inducement theory. See SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 118, at 375.
Although the majority places great weight in Senate and House Reports issued between 1922 and 1988, committee reports are often drafted by staff, rarely read, not
placed to a vote, and not subject to presidential veto. See Frank H. Easterbrook, The
Role of Original Intent in Statutory Construction, 11 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 59, 60
(1988). Moreover, there is no reason to assume that all workings of one house were
considered by its counterpart, let alone the President, who signed the bill. See Kenneth W. Starr, Observations About the Use of Legislative History, 1987 DUKE L.J.
371, 376. All that can reasonably be determined is that both houses and the President
agreed to the amended text of § 337, which authorizes the ITC to exclude only “articles that infringe.” See SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 118, at 376.
123. See Suprema, 796 F.3d at 1369 (O’Malley, J., dissenting); see also Oral
Argument, supra note 6, at 50:45-51:28 (“Don’t you think it was interesting that neither the parties before the ALJ, nor the ALJ, thought that this theory of infringement
liability was a viable one under 337. . . . [T]he Commission came up with this idea of
induced infringement on its own. . . . It does tell you something about whether or not
this was a well-established, permanently entrenched concept.”).
124. Chien, supra note 37, at 70.
125. Id. at 92.
126. Id. at 93.
127. K. William Watson, Still a Protectionist Trade Remedy: The Case for Repealing
Section
337,
CATO
INST.
8
(Sept.
19,
2012),
http://object.cato.org/sites/cato.org/files/pubs/pdf/PA708.pdf.
128. Id.
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this issue.129 Furthermore, there are several other ways to alleviate the concern that patentees would be left without a remedy.
First, infringement occurring within the United States can, and should,
be remedied through damages and injunctions available in district courts.130
The ITC “is fundamentally a trade forum, not an intellectual property forum.”131 This is particularly true where, as here, no harm can arise until infringing use occurs far from the ports policed by the ITC after goods are imported.132 Merely because a district court can provide a remedy the ITC cannot does not mean adequate relief is not available.
Second, Congress is clearly capable of eliminating loopholes at the request of patent owners.133 For example, after the Supreme Court held in
Deepsouth Packing Co. v. Laitram Corp. that a domestic exporter could not
be liable for supplying components used abroad to assemble a patented invention,134 Congress enacted § 271(f), extending liability to such exporters.135
Four years later, Congress concluded the remedies available at the ITC were
insufficient and added § 271(g), which extended liability to those who use,
offer to sell, sell, or import products made using patented processes.136 Additionally, in 1994, Congress amended § 271 in accordance with the Agreement
on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (“TRIPS”), incorpo129. E.g., Limelight Networks, Inc. v. Akamai Techs., Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2111, 2118
(2014) (“[W]hen Congress wishes to impose liability . . . it knows precisely how to do
so. The courts should not create liability . . . where Congress has elected not to extend that concept.”); City of Arlington v. F.C.C., 133 S. Ct. 1863, 1868 (2013)
(“Congress knows to speak in plain terms when it wishes to circumscribe . . . agency
discretion.”).
130. Suprema, Inc. v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 796 F.3d 1338, 1368 (Fed. Cir. 2015)
(en banc) (O’Malley, J., dissenting); see also 35 U.S.C. §§ 283, 284 (2012) (conferring the power to grant injunctions and award damages to district courts in patent
infringement cases).
131. John Mezzalingua Assocs. v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 660 F.3d 1322, 1327–28
(Fed. Cir. 2011); Watson, supra note 127, at 11 (“The ITC has no business imitating a
court of law and is not equipped to do so.”).
132. See Suprema, 796 F.3d at 1368 (O’Malley, J., dissenting).
133. See, e.g., Deepsouth Packing Co. v. Laitram Corp., 406 U.S. 518, 526
(1972).
134. See id. at 531.
135. See Patent Law Amendments Act of 1984, Pub. L. 98-622, § 101, 98 Stat.
3383 (1984) (codified at 35 U.S.C. § 271(f) (2012)); Microsoft Corp. v. AT & T
Corp., 550 U.S. 437, 439 (2007) (“Section 271(f) was a direct response to a gap in
U.S. patent law revealed by Deepsouth . . . .” ).
136. See Omnibus Trade & Competitiveness Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-418, §
9003, 102 Stat. 1107, 1563–64 (1988) (codified as amended at 35 U.S.C. §271(g)
(2012)); see also Bayer AG v. Housey Pharm., Inc., 340 F.3d 1367, 1374 (Fed. Cir.
2003) (“When enacting § 271(g), Congress recognized the . . . redress from the ITC,
but noted that the remedies available thereunder were insufficient. . . . [S]ection
271(g) was intended to address the same ‘articles’ as were addressed by section 1337,
but to add additional rights against importers of such ‘articles.’”).
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rating importation as conduct that may give rise to infringement liability.137
As these examples reveal, Congress could have extended liability to the conduct at issue in this case. Its decision not to do so should be respected.138
Third, Congress has amended § 337 in response to the ITC’s concerns.139 It could easily do so here. In re Amtorg Trading Corp.,140 a decision handed down by the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals, provides one
example. At the time of this decision, the use or sale of a product made using
a patented process did not constitute infringement.141 After examining the
legislative history and concluding that Congress did not enact § 337 to
“broaden the field of substantive patent rights[] and create rights in process
patents,” the court rejected the ITC’s argument that the importation of products made by means of a patented process was an unfair method of competition.142 In response, the ITC submitted to Congress a report criticizing the
court’s decision.143 Congress later amended the law, declaring the importation of products made using a patented process within the scope of § 337.144
Here, the ITC could have requested, and still could request, that Congress
simply amend the statute or explicitly declare the conduct at issue an unfair
method of competition or act.145 If Congress intended for the ITC to wield
authority “broad enough to prevent every type and form of unfair practice,”146
surely this request would not go unfulfilled.
Fourth, Congress provided the ITC an alternative means of excluding
non-infringing articles. In particular, § 337(a)(1)(A) proscribes “[u]nfair
137. Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr.
15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex
1C, 1869 U.N.T.S. 299.
138. See Corrected Brief of Dell, Inc. as Amici Curiae in Support of Appellants at
13, Suprema, Inc. v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 796 F.3d 1338 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (No. 20121170), 2014 WL 4312226, at *13.
139. See, e.g., The Omnibus Foreign Trade & Competitiveness Act of 1988, Pub.
L. No. 100-418, 102 Stat. 1107 (codified at 19 U.S.C. § 1337 (2012)).
140. 75 F.2d 826 (C.C.P.A. 1935), superseded by statute Law of June 1, 1940,
Pub. L. No. 710, 54 Stat. 724 as recognized in TianRui Group Co. Ltd. v. Int’l Trade
Comm’n, 661 F.3d 1322 (Fed. Cir. 2011).
141. Id. at 831.
142. Id. at 834.
143. See TianRui Group, 661 F.3d at 1334. In particular, the Commission disagreed with the idea that “the importation for use or sale of products made abroad by a
process patented in the United States was not an unfair method of competition.” U.S.
Tariff Comm’n, Nineteenth Annual Report 12–13 (1936).
144. See TianRui Group, 661 F.3d at 1333–34.
145. See Alden Abbot, The Federal Circuit Misapplies Chevron Deference (and
Risks a Future “Supreme Scolding”) in Suprema, Inc. v. ITC, TRADE ON MARKET
(Aug.
14,
2015),
http://truthonthemarket.com/2015/08/14/the-federal-circuitmisapplies-chevron-deference-and-risks-a-future-supreme-scolding-in-suprema-inc-vitc/.
146. Suprema, Inc. v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 796 F.3d 1338, 1350 (Fed. Cir. 2015)
(en banc) (emphasis omitted) (quoting S. REP. NO. 67-595, at 3 (1922)).
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methods of competition and unfair acts in the importation of [non-infringing]
articles,” the effect of which is to substantially injure domestic industry.147
The determination of injury, unlike that of patent infringement, is “not controlled by precedent” and falls “particularly within the expertise” of the
ITC.148 Thus, if Cross Match could establish some causal connection between the conduct in question and lost sales,149 the ITC could have based its
exclusion order on the theory that the importation of Suprema’s noninfringing scanners and post-importation sale of the functional products constituted an unfair method of competition or unfair act, the effect of which was
to injure the biometrics industry.

C. The Consequences
The immediate impact of the court’s holding is clear. The ITC may now
exclude non-infringing staple articles intended to induce post-importation
infringement, extending § 337 liability to those who perform most steps of a
patented method abroad and then import, assemble, and use the final product
within the United States.150 However, the costs of the court’s decision may
far outweigh this windfall to patent owners.
As an initial matter, the court’s holding complicates the administration
of exclusion orders.151 Previously, U.S. Customs and Border Protection
(“Customs”) only examined the physical properties of imported articles.152
Now, Customs must also determine whether importers and downstream consumers intend to modify and then use products in an infringing manner long
after importation and far from the points of entry it polices.153 This determination is less precise than that of actual infringement, and Customs may very
well exclude all of an importer’s goods on the mistaken perception that some
will later be used in an infringing manner.154 This is especially likely given

147. Tariff Act of 1930, 19 U.S.C. § 1337(a)(1)(A) (2012).
148. Fischer & Porter Co., Inc. v. U.S. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 831 F.2d 1574, 1577

(Fed. Cir. 1987).
149. Bally/Midway Mfg. Co. v. U.S. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 714 F.2d 1117, 1124
(Fed. Cir. 1983) (“Where the unfair practice is the importation of products that infringe a domestic industry’s . . . patent right, even a relatively small loss of sales may
establish . . . the requisite injury . . . .”).
150. See Suprema, 796 F.3d at 1369 (O’Malley, J., dissenting).
151. See id. at 1366.
152. See id.
153. See id. (“Congress did not intend for Customs agents to need to decipher an
importer’s intent to induce infringement at some later date. It, instead, avoided such
an unworkable construct by requiring the Commission to issue exclusion orders based
on the infringing nature of the article itself.”); Corrected Brief of Dell, Inc., supra
note 138, at 21–22.
154. See Suprema, 796 F.3d at 1366 (O’Malley, J., dissenting); see also id. at
1353 (Dyk, J., dissenting).
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that Customs may err on the side of exclusion in light of its “aggressive . . .
enforcement program” at the border.155
Thus, the court’s holding has the potential to disrupt businesses that import goods. Furthermore, the holding could take from consumers a wide variety of products routinely used for legitimate, non-infringing purposes.156
This may present an issue for the electronics industry, which largely assembles devices such as smartphones and tablet computers abroad and then imports them into the United States.157 A single smartphone may contain technology covered by 200,000 patents, and infringement of only one patent
could exclude the entire product line from the U.S. market.158 Consumers
may lose a competitive product because a disputed patent that only contributes pennies to the total value of the product may or may not be infringed
after importation.159 As former ITC Commissioner, Charlotte Lane, has noted, removing a product from the marketplace in this fashion can “devastate a
company forever.”160
By endorsing an interpretation of § 337 that allows the ITC to predicate
exclusion orders on the inducement of post-importation infringement, the
court’s holding may also further impede innovation. Patent law seeks a “balance between the need to encourage innovation and the avoidance of monopolies which stifle competition.”161 However, the ITC promotes trade, not the
progress of science or the useful arts.162 Exclusion of a product necessarily
decreases competition, a driving force behind innovation.163 As Mark Lemley and Carl Shapiro have observed, the mere threat of an exclusion order can
“discourage innovation by firms that design and manufacture complex prod-

155. CBP Port of Savannah Seizes Over $1.6 Million in Sunglasses for Counterfeit Trademark, U.S. CUSTOMS & BORDER PROTECTION (Aug. 12, 2014),
https://www.cbp.gov/newsroom/local-media-release/2014-08-12-000000/cbp-portsavannah-seizes-over-16-million-sunglasses.
156. See Brief of Amicus Curiae Microsoft Corp. in Support of Neither Party,
supra note 56, at 3; Corrected Brief of Dell, Inc., supra note 138, at 1.
157. Watson, supra note 127, at 2.
158. See id.
159. Id.
160. Charlotte R. Lane, The International Trolling Commission: Patent Trolls
Find a Friend in a Federal Agency that Has Drifted from Its Original Mission, WALL
STREET
J.
(Oct.
7,
2013,
7:17
PM),
http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424127887323308504579083701201429502?c
b=logged0.09161893449674324.
161. Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 146 (1989)
(citing U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8).
162. Kumar, supra note 33, at 580.
163. Id. at 572; Kristin Viaswanathan, What International Trade Agreements
Have to Do with Innovation, BIOTECHNOW (June 26, 2014), http://www.biotechnow.org/public-policy/2014/06/what-international-trade-agreements-have-to-do-withinnovation.
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ucts . . . [and] can even lead to circumstances in which no one can profitably
produce a product with social value.”164
In addition, the majority’s holding will incentivize patentees to file §
337 complaints, increasing the number of disputes brought before the ITC,
and an increased ITC workload will burden taxpayers.165 Litigation at the
ITC requires “tremendous resources,” and the agency has already “requested
– and received – multiple budget increases over the last five years.”166 Because district courts and the ITC largely tread the same ground in parallel
proceedings, increased traffic can only waste time and resources.167 And
because patentees can litigate both in district court and at the ITC, conflicting
judgments may occur.168
The court’s holding also creates other uncertainties. As one commentator has argued, the decision may conflict with Limelight.169 In addition, the
majority’s decision to defer to the ITC’s judgment on matters of patent law
may lay the groundwork for increased deference to the agency in the coming
years. However, in light of Certain Electronic Devices, this route may be an
unpredictable one; the agency to which the court now defers is averse to following its own precedent. Moreover, the court’s holding promotes an increasingly awkward jurisdictional overlap: the ITC is now granted deference
in determining whether an article infringes a patent at the same time that district courts retain original and exclusive jurisdiction over alleged acts of infringement by an importer.170 Because ITC proceedings may, under certain
circumstances, have priority over district courts,171 the majority’s holding

164. Mark A. Lemley & Carl Shapiro, Patent Holdup and Royalty Stacking, 85
TEX. L. REV. 1991, 2010 (2007).
165. Lane, supra note 160.
166. See id.
167. Id.
168. See Chien, supra note 37, at 70 (noting that 65% of the ITC investigations
initiated between January 1995 and June 2007 had a district court counterpart).
169. See Abbot, supra note 145 (“[This decision] may face stormy waters if it
eventually is subject to U.S. Supreme Court review. . . . Judge O’Malley . . . relied
heavily on the Supreme Court’s 2014 decision in Limelight Networks v. Akamai
Technologies, when the Court held that inducement liability may arise if and only if
there is direct patent infringement.”). Interestingly, the Supreme Court has yet to
decide a patent case arising at the ITC. Holly Lance, Not So Technical: An Analysis
of Federal Circuit Patent Decisions Appealed from the ITC, 17 MICH. TELECOMM. &
TECH. L. REV. 243, 268 n.147 (2010).
170. Kaisha v. Bombardier, Inc., No. SA CV 00-549, 2001 WL 1388911, at *3
(C.D. Cal. Mar. 9, 2001) (citing Texas Instruments Inc. v. Tessera, Inc., 231 F.3d
1325, 1330 (Fed. Cir. 2000)).
171. For example, when a claim in a district court involves issues in a proceeding
before the ITC, the district court, upon request, must stay its proceedings until the
ITC’s determination becomes final. See 28 U.S.C. § 1659(a) (2012).
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further solidifies the notion that the ITC is a substitute, rather than an alternative, for district courts.172
Another uncertainty is also jurisdictional in nature. The majority repeatedly suggested that the purpose of § 337 was to grant the ITC authority
“broad enough to prevent every type and form of unfair practice,”173 and it is
a cardinal rule of interpretation that one must construe a text to further its
purpose.174 Although one would therefore expect the ITC’s authority to expand in close cases, a panel of the Federal Circuit later cabined the agency’s
ability to prevent unfair trade practices in ClearCorrect Operating, LLC v.
International Trade Commission.175 In ClearCorrect, Chief Judge Prost,
joined by Judge O’Malley, held that the term “articles” meant only material
objects, stripping the ITC of authority over electronically transmitted digital
data.176 Writing in dissent and relying in part on Suprema, Judge Newman
contended that this construction of the term “articles” ignored “Congressional
intent to vest the Commission with broad enforcement authority to remedy
unfair trade acts.”177 The Federal Circuit later denied a petition for rehearing
en banc, and of those who comprised the majority in Suprema, only Judge
Newman dissented.178

VI. CONCLUSION
Although the court’s holding will allow patentees to exclude noninfringing imports ultimately used to infringe patents within the United
States, this benefit comes at the expense of a more workable ITC remedial
scheme, incentives to innovate, and the long-term welfare of American businesses and consumers. The court should have affirmed the panel’s interpretation, one that was well grounded in the plain language of § 337. Instead,
based on overstated jurisdictional concerns and policy considerations, the
court labored to extend relief to patentees when relief was already available in
district courts.

172. See Suprema, Inc. v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 796 F.3d 1338, 1368 (Fed. Cir.
2015) (en banc).
173. Id. at 1350 (emphasis omitted).
174. See SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 118, at 174.
175. ClearCorrect Operating, LLC v. Int’l Trade Comm’n., 810 F.3d 1283 (Fed.
Cir. 2015).
176. Id. at 1286.
177. Id. at 1306 (Newman, J., dissenting) (quoting Suprema, Inc. v. Int’l Trade
Comm’n, 796 F.3d 1338, 1350 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (en banc)).
178. ClearCorrect Operating, LLC v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, No. 2014-1527, 2016
WL 1295014, at *1 (Fed. Cir. Mar. 31, 2016).
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